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Abstract 
We study the double exit phenomenon—new IPO firms get acquired quickly in the M & A market. In 
this paper, we attempt to discern the distinct characteristics of new public firms that made them 
acquired soon after their IPOs. Specifically we find that double exit firms are those backed by venture 
capital. Double exit firms generally have prestigious investment banks underwrite their IPOs. High 
technology firms are more likely to be taken over soon after their IPOs. Also, double exit firms have 
higher level of intangible assets. We suggest that IPO may play an important role in firms’ following 
acquisition incidence. First, IPO helps to reduce ex ante transaction costs between firms and financial 
markets, such as raising external capitals. Second, IPOs wink signals concerning the quality of the 
firm.  
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
“The time between an IPO and merger is getting shorter all the time. Yesmail.com (Nasdaq: YESM) goes 
public in September and is bought in December by CMGI (Nasdaq: CMGI), …When you look at 
e-Greetings regulatory filings you have to wonder why it even bothered with an IPO” (Note 1). 
Press constantly reports firm’s decision between an IPO and takeover. In another more well known 
example, analysts articulate that “Online payment company PayPal is trying to test the dismal initial 
public offering waters, and some analysts are speculating that its filing may serve as a tool to get its 
finances out in front of potential acquirers, including rival e-Bay” (Note 2). Paypal launched its 
70-million dollars IPO in February 2002, and five months later it announced that it was being acquired by 
Ebay with a price tag of 1.5 billion dollars.  
For founders, venture capitalists, early stage investors, who wish to cash out and diversify their risks, 
choosing an optimal exit strategy is a complex undertaking. They consider traditional strategies, either 
Initial Public Offerings (IPO), or acquisition by another firm in the Merger and Acquisition (M & A) 
market. However, the above corporate anecdotes highlight a dual path strategy, which has become 
more popular among firms—riding on the excitement of IPO and simultaneously posturing for 
potential bidders in the post-IPO market (Note 3) (Hereinafter referred to as double exit firms).  
As most of the previous paper in this area examines IPO or takeover as a separate and independent path 
for private firms, the increasing number of double exit firms shows the evidence that firms are seeking 
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the connection between the IPO market and M & A market. Instead of being simply pigeonholed into 
one choice, entrepreneurs can create valuable options for themselves. They probably use IPO as an 
intermediate strategic step to reach their ultimate goal of being acquired (Note 4). 
While no firm will reveal its exact motivation of going public is to be taken over, neither can 
researchers test the intention empirically because firms either can seek potential bidders or are being 
sought out, we are not suggesting getting acquired is double exit firms’ motivation behind their IPOs. 
An important question that follows is why those double exit firms are quickly acquired after becoming 
public even if being taken over is not the primary motive for an IPO, what intrinsic characteristics of 
the double exit firms make them an attractive takeover target in the M & A market. A similar research 
was conducted by Reuer and Shen (2004). They compare firms with “sequential divestiture through 
IPOs” with “outright divestiture of private firms”, and argue IPO can ameliorate the costs due to 
information asymmetries in M & A market. 
In this paper we propose that IPO, as an information dissemination tool and a signaling tool, can help 
some firms to increase their visibility, and reinforce their identity. Particularly, when target firms are 
unable to demonstrate their quality or credibility, going public can mitigate the effect of information 
asymmetry and enhance the likelihood of being acquired by prospective bidders. Our research 
contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It provides empirical evidence to explain the dual exit 
phenomenon. In addition, it further supports previous research on how IPO market and M & A market 
are closely connected. Finally, it complements the entrepreneurial literature that IPO offers a valuable 
option for insiders to eventually sell out their firms. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews various theories related to IPO 
and M & A markets, and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describe our data and sample, and explain the 
construction of empirical proxies used in this research. Section 4 presents our empirical test results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The theory on double exit strategy is not new. Zingales (1995) proposes a framework that IPO is a 
mechanism employed by an initial owner to maximize his wealth. The owner sells cash flow rights in a 
firm in IPO to dispersed shareholders to maximize his sales proceeds. Then he can eventually sell the 
control rights by directly negotiating with a potential bidder. A particular combination of firm control 
and dispersed ownership will decide whether the firm should stay private or go public. Consistent with 
this argument, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) find high turnover of control in newly public 
Italian firms, and Rydqvist and Hogholm (1995) analyze Swedish data to show a key motivation of 
IPOs is to relinquish the control rights. 
In Hsieh, Lyanders and Zhdanov’s (2008) real option based model, they link firms’ going public 
decision with their subsequent acquisition activities. By going public, managers learn the true value of 
their own firm. Thus, an IPO allows a firm to exercise its acquisition option to optimize the value of the 
takeover gain. Celikyurt, Sevilir, Shivdasani (2008) show a higher amount of acquisition activities by 
newly public firms. While they look at the role of IPO from the acquiring firms’ perspective, a 
complementary view can be taken by examining the role of IPO for target firms.   
Brau and Fawcett (2006) report survey results from CFOs that the most cited motives for IPO were the 
creation of publics shares for use in future acquisitions and establishing a market value for the firm. 
Public company’s stock can be used as buyers’ currency, as well as seller’s currency. An established 
market value is equally important for bidders and targets. Rosen, Smart and Zutter (2005) find that 
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banks which go public are more likely to become takeover targets than a control group of banks which 
stay private. 
Previously there are two papers that directly investigate the payoffs of the dual path strategy. Brau, 
Sutton, and Hatch (2010) study two groups of entrepreneurial firms. One group goes through the 
regulatory IPO filing process, but later withdraws their IPO filings and subsequently gets acquired (the 
dual tracking firms). Another group successfully makes their IPO debut, and then is taken over soon 
afterwards in the public market (the double exit firms). They find those firms are venture capital 
backed, underwritten by prestigious investment banks, and they receive significantly higher takeover 
premium than private firms (22-26% for dual tracking firms and 18-21% for double exit firms 
respectively). But surprisingly “there is no premium benefit in actually completing the IPOs as 
compared to simply filing and then withdrawing the IPO”. Similarly, Lian and Wang (2007) examine 
132 dual tracking firms and ask the question why a private firm file for IPO and incur additional costs 
while it actually sells itself in a takeover. They find that those dual tracking targets sell at a 58 percent 
acquisition premium relative to comparable private target that never file IPO. Those dual tracking firms 
simply enjoy the greater valuation by exhibiting the “almost public” image. They argue that “bidders 
are willing to value these ‘almost public’ withdrawn-IPO targets as similar to public targets and to pay 
more for dual tracking firms than for similar pure private targets”.  
Based on the previous theoretical background and empirical evidence, we predict the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that an IPO firm will become a double exit firm is positively related to 
underpricing. 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood that an IPO firm will become a double exit firm is positively associated 
with the reputation of the underwriters of IPO. 
While we focus on IPO to discern some of the distinct features of a double exit firm, we also wish to 
test the effect of some of the properties that are inherent in the firm. Every IPO involves underwriters, 
but not all of them are backed by Venture Capitals (VCs). The presence of VC can also signal the 
quality of the private firm in a number of ways. Venture capitalists are highly selective in funding 
proposals. VCs not only invest their fund in the firm but also participate in firms’ operations, such as, 
serve on the boards, formulate business strategies, and hire top management.  
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood that an IPO firm will become a double exit firm is greater with the 
presence of a venture capitalist. 
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood that an IPO firm will become a double exit firm is greater if the firm is a 
high-tech firm. 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Data 
We obtain the data used in this study from several databases. Our IPO sample comes from Securities 
Data Company (SDC) databases on U.S. Global New Issues. It covers all U.S. IPOs issued from 1985 
to 2005. We apply the common standards used in many other research on IPOs by excluding unit 
offering, closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), spin-offs limited partnerships, and 
previous leverage buyouts. We also eliminated financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999), and very small issues with an offer price under $5.  
Moreover, the IPO firm must be available on the Compustat annual industrial database for the fiscal 
year prior to the IPO offering, to assure that the accounting information necessary to study firm’s 
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characteristics before IPO. To get data on stock prices, returns, and shares outstanding, we also require 
the firm should be on the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database during the first calendar month following the IPO. This results in a final sample of 4,732 
IPOs. 
The sample of acquisitions is collected from SDC U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database. We only 
include 100% acquisitions by U.S. public firms from 1985 to 2007. Using a 6-digit CUSIPs to match 
the IPO sample and acquisition sample, we identified 494 double exit firms, firms that are acquired 
within three years of their IPO issuance. We also use the Venture Capital Backing flag in SDC to 
distinguish between VC backed and non-VC backed IPOs. 
Table 1 panel A reports the year distribution of the firms that went public between 1985 and 2005. Our 
aggregate sample consists of 4,732 initial public offerings, with 494 firms acquired within three years 
of their IPOs, roughly 10.44%. 1996 was the year with largest number of IPOs (563) and 2003 was the 
year with the smallest (47). The largest year for IPOs that were acquired within three years was also 
1996 with 78 double exit firms. Panel B compares double exit firms with private firms as acquisition 
targets during 1985 to 2007. Panel C shows the timing between IPO and acquisition, among our 494 
double exit firms, 37 firms were acquired within 6 months after their IPOs, 84 within 6 to 12 months, 
186 within 12 to 24 months, and 187 within 24-36 months. 
 
Table 1. Panel A—Distribution by IPO Years 
IPO Filing Year All IPOs Issued Double Exit Firms Percentage 
1985 97 10 10.31% 
1986 260 13 5.00% 
1987 218 8 3.67% 
1988 74 4 5.41% 
1989 63 3 4.76% 
1990 81 5 6.17% 
1991 206 11 5.34% 
1992 315 21 6.67% 
1993 395 30 7.59% 
1994 324 36 11.11% 
1995 356 59 16.57% 
1996 563 78 13.85% 
1997 380 45 11.84% 
1998 235 23 9.79% 
1999 413 70 16.95% 
2000 324 35 10.80% 
2001 63 9 14.29% 
2002 59 6 10.17% 
2003 47 7 14.89% 
2004 134 15 11.19% 
2005 125 6 4.80% 
Total 4732 494  
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Panel B—Distribution by Target Firms 
Year M & A 
Announced 
Target=double 
exit firms 
Percentage 
Target=private 
firms 
Percentage 
Total M & A 
deals 
1985 2 1.02% 66 33.50% 197 
1986 4 1.25% 170 53.29% 319 
1987 9 3.17% 144 50.70% 284 
1988 18 7.17% 115 45.82% 251 
1989 9 3.63% 132 53.23% 248 
1990 3 1.54% 117 60.00% 195 
1991 4 1.54% 161 61.92% 260 
1992 5 1.33% 257 68.35% 376 
1993 10 1.76% 408 71.96% 567 
1994 27 3.35% 548 68.07% 805 
1995 37 4.52% 527 64.43% 818 
1996 50 4.60% 765 70.38% 1087 
1997 59 3.87% 1112 73.01% 1523 
1998 69 4.20% 1205 73.30% 1644 
1999 64 5.12% 829 66.37% 1249 
2000 50 4.30% 820 70.45% 1164 
2001 40 5.90% 416 61.36% 678 
2002 29 4.96% 410 70.09% 585 
2003 14 2.30% 413 67.93% 608 
2004 8 1.11% 532 73.79% 721 
2005 12 1.52% 607 76.93% 789 
2006 9 1.12% 617 76.46% 807 
2007 8 1.42% 419 74.29% 564 
Obs 494  10790  15739 
 
Panel C—Double Exit Firms’ IPO and Acquisition Timing 
Between IPO Issue Date and MA Announcement Date Double Exit Firms 
0-6 months 37 
6-12 months 84 
12-24 months 186 
24-36 months 187 
Total 494 
 
Table 2 panel A shows the industry distribution based on 2-digit SIC level. As can be seen from the 
table, manufacturing sector (1,915 firms, 40.47%) and service sector (1,627 firms, 34.38%) constitute 
the majority of our IPO samples. In Panel B, our high-tech firms include those with primary three-digit 
SIC codes of 357, 367, 369, 382, 384, and 737, based on Field and Hanka (2001) (Note 5), and they 
represent 28.51% of the total IPO sample with 1,353 firms. Among 494 double exit firms, 219 
(approximately 43%) are in the defined hi-tech sectors. Panel C shows at 2-digit SIC code industry 
level,  most of the double exit firms (66.35%) are acquired by firms within the same industry, while 
54.79% of private firms are acquired by public firms in their own industry. At 4-digit SIC code 
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industry level, there are still more double exit firms acquired by industry peers than are private firms 
(39% vs. 32%). This evidence suggests that double exit firms relatively stand out in horizontal mergers. 
 
Table 2. Panel A—Industry Distribution of IPOs 
Industry SIC Code
ALL IPOs 
Issued 
(pct) 
Double 
Exit IPOs 
(pct) 
Agriculture, Forest, Fishing 01-09 16 0.34% 3 0.61% 
Mining 10-14 109 2.30% 16 3.24% 
Construction 15-17 57 1.20% 4 0.81% 
Manufacturing  20-39 1915 40.47% 167 33.81% 
Transportation 40-49 380 8.03% 43 8.70% 
Wholesale 50, 51 205 4.33% 14 2.83% 
Retail 52-59 423 8.94% 36 7.29% 
Financial 60-69 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Services 70-80 1431 30.24% 196 39.68% 
Legal, educational, social, 
other services 
81-96 196 4.14% 15 3.04% 
Total  4732 100.00% 494 100.00% 
 
Panel B—Distribution by High Technology Firms 
 All IPOs Issued Double Exit Firms 
357 computer and office equipment  137 9 
367 electronic components and accessories  182 28 
369 miscellaneous electrical machinery, 
equipment, and supplies  
20 0 
382 laboratory apparatus and analytical, optical, 
measuring, and controlling instruments  
75 7 
384 surgical, medical, and dental instruments 
and supplies  
171 33 
737 computer programming, data processing, 
and other computer related  
768 142 
Subtotal 1353 219 
 
Panel C—Target and Acquirer Industries 
Target and acquirer in 
the same industry 
Target=double 
exit firms 
pct 
Target=private
firms 
pct 
by 2-digt SIC codes 328 66.35% 5912 54.79% 
by 3-digt SIC codes 276 56.02% 4856 45.00% 
by 4-digt SIC codes 193 39.01% 3352 31.57% 
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3.2 Model Specification and Measures of Firm Specific, Industry Specific, Information Asymmetry, and 
Control Variables. 
In this part we discuss the model specification, and construction and measurement of the different 
variables of our interest. 
Based on the hypotheses developed in section 2, we estimate the following maximum likelihood probit 
model of the probability of getting acquired soon after IPO. Individual firms are indexed i for each year 
t, in the sample: 
Pr (Double Exit Firmi,t=1)=F (β0+β1 IPO underpricingi+β2 IB reputationi+β3 VC backedi+β4 
High-Techi+β5 Control Variablesi,t-1+ε) 
where the dependent variable Double Exit firm takes a value of one if the firm is acquired in year t 
within the three years following its IPO, and zero otherwise. F (·) is the cumulative distribution 
function of a standard normal variable (Note 6). All variables will be discussed below. At any time t, 
the sample includes all firms that are still public at that point in time, and the firms that get acquired in 
that year. After a firm gets acquired with three years, that firm is dropped from the sample. For firms 
that are acquired within three years of IPO, they each will have 4 firm-year observations in our sample.  
To test H1, we define Underpricing as the difference between first trading day close price and offer 
price, scaled by the offer price. As suggested by prior research, information asymmetry is assumed in 
most explanations for underpricing of IPOs. We expect double exit firms are those with higher degrees 
of information asymmetry, and IPO is employed as a signal to mitigate the effect of information 
asymmetry. 
Based on H2, the variable Prestigious IB assumes a value of one if the IPO’s lead underwriter is a 
prestigious investment bank with score no less than 7.5, zero otherwise. According to Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), the investment bank scores range from 1 to 9, with the higher value indicating a more 
reputable underwriter. The important certification role for investment banks in the IPO process 
suggests that double exit firms are more likely to be those underwritten by high-tiered investment 
banks. 
To test H3, VC Backing is a dummy variable, one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists, zero 
otherwise. Venture capitals typically reject 98% of the proposals, and their core capability is their skill 
to identify young firms with novel technologies that have the potential to generate abnormal returns. At 
an early stage, VCs also take an active role in managing the firm. Thus, we expect double exit firms are 
more likely to be those backed by venture capitals.  
Finally to test H4, Hi-Tech is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s primary three-digit SIC codes 
is 357, 367, 369, 382, 384, or 737, zero otherwise. Firms operating in high-tech industries usually 
spend heavily on research and development to keep pace with modern trends. However, high spending 
on research and development does not necessarily guarantee “more creativity, higher profit or a greater 
market share” (Note 7), which provides another ex ante valuation challenge. High-tech IPOs generally 
receive very favorable perceptions from investors, especially during the internet bubble period 
(Maksimovic & Pichler, 2001; Brau, Francis, & Kohers, 2003). They are also popular acquisition 
candidates in the M & A market. Kohers and Kohers (2000) find the acquisition premium for high-tech 
targets were significantly larger than that for non-high-tech firms. Under our hypothesis, high tech 
firms have a greater incentive to go public in the first place because IPO can not only reduce 
information asymmetry between hi-tech firms and financial market (high intangible assets, high growth 
potential, high capital spending, and high R & D investment), but also signal the quality of their 
products or services, and enhance their visibility and reputation (Brau, Francis, & Kohers, 2003; Brau 
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& Fawcett, 2006).  
Typically, an IPO allows insiders to gradually relinquish their ownership and cash out part of their stake. 
Firm insiders can design an IPO to result in various level of corporate control or liquidity. Following, 
Brau, Francis, Kohers (2003), Insider Ownership is the percentage of the ownership of the firm not 
offered in IPO (i.e., 1—the ratio of total IPO shares divided total numbers of share outstanding after IPO). 
Liquidity is the ratio between secondary shares in the IPO to total shares. Selling considerable secondary 
shares or reducing stock ownership usually send negative signals to the investors because by doing so 
entrepreneurs and other top management in the firm, in turn, reduces their incentives to expend effort to 
maximize firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1977). 
In addition to the variables discussed above, we also incorporate a number of control variables, at firm 
level, industry level and macroeconomic level, which have been found significant by prior research in 
affecting firm’s decision to go public.  
Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (Note 8). Firm size usually reflects different degrees 
of information asymmetry. Large firms generally get more media attention and analysts coverage, so that 
their value is easier to identify. Besides, IPOs involve explicit high cost (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; 
Pagano & Roell, 1998; Ritter, 2008), and only big firms can enjoy economy of scale (Jensen & 
Ljungqvist, 1996). Then smaller firms or firms with high intangible assets tend to go public to reveal 
their value, and to signal their quality by enduring the cost, and undergoing the scrutiny of SEC, financial 
analysts, and a broad base of shareholders. To control for firm’s debt level, we compute Debt as the ratio 
of the firm’s long-term debt to total assets. Firms with debt can credibly show that they have already been 
undergone the close monitoring of lenders. Intangibility is calculated as 1—the ratio of net property, 
plant and equipments divided by total assets. Intangible assets, such as, copyrights, trademark, goodwill, 
etc., often cannot be physically measured. Therefore, firms with higher intangible assets face greater 
valuation uncertainty, thus imposing a greater challenge for corporate raiders. Again we expect 
Intangibility to have a positive relationship with the probability of double exit. 
To capture the firm’s future growth prospects, we use the market value of the firm’s common stock 
versus book value to construct Market-to-Book. CAPEX is the ratio of the firm’s capital expenditure 
scaled by total assets. ROA measures the return on asset, which is the firm’s EBITDA divided by total 
assets. Consistent with previous literature, we also constructed FCF to address a possible acquisition 
reason—the free cash flow problem. Jensen (1986) noted the agency costs associated with free cash 
flows, which allowed firms’ managers to finance projects with negative NPVs. Following Mehran and 
Peristiani (2009), FCF is the net cash flow (after-tax operating income before depreciation) minus cash 
and preferred dividends and interest payments, normalized by total assets. 
Next, we define three proxies to examine the effect of industry environment. HHI is the Herfindahl index, 
which captures the degree of competition within an industry. This index is constructed by summing up 
the squared sales of all firms of a particular industry at the 2-digit SIC code. The higher the index, the 
higher the industry concentration. Literature is mixed on the effect of industry concentration on 
acquisitions. High industry concentration provides an environment unconducive to firm survival or 
further consolidation due to antitrust concerns. Thus, IPO would be too costly, and firms would opt for a 
direct merger in high concentration industries. However, high degree of industry competition also 
implies a larger set of potential acquirers and reduced information asymmetry. The role of industry 
concentration thus becomes an empirical issue. To determine if there is a leading firm in the industry, we 
define a Big Player dummy variable which is equal to one if there is a public company with more than 
30% market share at the time of acquisition in the same industry, and zero otherwise. Following 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp              Journal of Business Theory and Practice               Vol. 6, No. 2, 2018 
192 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Chemmanur Nandy and He (2009), we use the industry average standard deviation in analysts’ forecast, 
to proxy for the information asymmetry within a particular industry. The variable STDEV is constructed 
by using the analyst’ forecast on EPS from I/B/E/S. The variable Analyst N is the industry mean of 
number of analysts following one firm.  
Finally, we present two market-timing variables that have been hypothesized to influence the likelihood 
of acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) claim that 
merger waves are triggered by stock market overvaluation. On the contrary, Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) relate the clustering of merger activities to periods of economic contractions. To control for the 
time varying effect of the equity market, we use CRSP_VW as the lagged annual return of value 
weighted CRSP market index return. Two alternative measures are motivated by the observed merger 
waves over time (Jared, 2004; Duchin & Schmit, 2007), the number and the total deal value of mergers, 
in each industry as defined by 2-digit SIC code, over the past 12 months. To capture the intensity of 
merger activities in the same industry over the past year, Merger Intensity N is the logarithm of (1 plus) 
the accumulated number of deals in acquirer’s industry over the previous 12 months. Merger Intensity 
AMT is the logarithm of (1 plus) the accumulated value of mergers measured by the deal value in the 
acquirer’s industry over the year prior to the merger (Note 9). To capture the interaction of hi-tech firms 
and the internet bubble time period, we create a dummy variable equal to one, if it is a high-tech firm that 
went public in 1999 or 2000, zero otherwise. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate Tests 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the two subsamples of double exit firms and mature 
public firms respectively. Table 3 further presents the p-value of the two sample t-test for the 
differences in mean and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the differences in underlying distributions of 
all variables in interest. All reported statistics are measured one fiscal year before their IPOs. 
Consistent with hypothesis H1, we see that the double exit firms are more severely underpriced in their 
IPOs. The average underpricing for double exit firm is 27.3%, while that of mature IPOs is 21.2%. 
Hypothesis H2 predicts that double exit firms are more likely backed by venture capitalists. In Table 3, 
on average 55.1% of the double exit firms are backed by venture capitalists, 12.3% higher than firms 
that remain public three years after IPO. Moreover, 77.9% Double exit firms are underwritten by 
prestigious investment banks, 14.4% higher than rest of the IPO firms, which confirms hypothesis H3. 
Finally, 44.3% of the double exit firms are from hi-tech industries, which is about 12.5% higher than 
mature IPOs. Double exit firms also have a higher proportion of high tech firms that went public during 
1999-2000, the internet bubble period (14.5% vs. 7.6%). The acquisition soon after their IPOs appears 
to ride the merger wave in their industries. In summary, the results of the univariate tests strongly 
support the predictions of our 4 hypotheses. In the next subsection, we will examine whether these 
results hold in a multivariate framework. 
 
Table 3. Univariate Tests 
 Mature IPOs Double Exit IPOs   
 
N Mean Median N Mean Median
Diff in 
Means 
Diff in 
Medians 
Size-Log(Assets) 4238 3.613 3.490 494 3.640 3.340 -0.027 0.150
Size-Log(Sales) 4238 3.700 3.799 494 3.627 3.483 0.073 0.316***
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Underpricing 4238 0.212 0.078 494 0.273 0.107 -0.061*** -0.029***
VC Backing 4238 0.428 0.000 494 0.551 1.000 -0.123*** -1.000***
Prestigious IB 4238 0.635 1.000 494 0.779 1.000 -0.144*** 0.000***
Hi Tech 4238 0.319 0.000 494 0.443 0.000 -0.125*** 0.000***
Liquidity 4238 0.124 0.000 494 0.117 0.000 0.007 0.000
Insider 
Ownership 
4238 0.667 0.704 494 0.674 0.719 -0.007 -0.015***
Fcf 4238 -0.308 -0.014 494 0.674 0.719 -0.982 -0.733***
Market-to-book 4238 2.012 2.266 494 0.734 0.346 1.278 1.920
Debt 4238 0.264 0.120 494 0.250 0.098 0.014 0.022
Intangbillity 4238 0.747 0.822 494 0.758 0.834 -0.011 -0.012
Capex 4238 0.093 0.055 494 0.093 0.056 0.000 -0.001
Rnd 4238 0.163 0.000 494 0.189 0.030 -0.026 -0.030***
Roa 4238 -0.110 0.127 494 -0.170 0.091 0.060 0.036***
HHI 4238 0.083 0.058 494 0.076 0.050 0.007 0.008***
Big Player 4238 0.123 0.000 494 0.077 0.000 0.046*** 0.000***
Stdev 4238 0.046 0.000 494 0.077 0.000 -0.031 0.000
Analyst N 4238 0.003 0.000 494 0.004 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
Hitech Bubble 4238 0.076 0.000 494 0.145 0.000 -0.070*** 0.000***
Merger Intensity 
by deal numbers 
4238 2.838 2.708 494 3.427 3.637 -0.589*** -0.929***
Merger Intensity 
by deal Amt 
4238 11.938 12.338 494 12.961 13.922 -1.023*** -1.584***
CRSP_vw 4238 0.187 0.212 494 0.191 0.223 -0.005 -0.011
 
4.2 Multivariate Tests 
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the Probit model. In Panel A, the explanatory 
variables are limited to firm specific variables. In Panel B, we supplement the model by adding 
industry level variables. Finally, Panel C includes market timing variables as well as firm specific and 
industry specific variables of Panels A and B, as hypothesized in the previous section.   
In Panel A, with firm level variables, three of our hypothesized variables, VC Backing, Prestigious IB, 
Hi Tech are significant, except for Underpricing. The coefficient on is negatively related to the 
probability of becoming a double exit firm, which is inconsistent with H1. Consistent with H2, VC 
Backing has a positive effect on the likelihood of being acquired. In all specifications, the coefficients 
of VC Backing are positive and significant at the 1% level. The odds ratio indicates that given 
everything else equal, with the presence of VC, the probability of getting acquired is about 30% higher. 
Consistent with H3, Prestigious IB also has a positive effect on the likelihood of being acquired. In all 
specifications, the coefficients of Prestigious IB are positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
chance of being taken over for firms underwritten by a prestigious investment bank stand is 70% higher. 
Consistent with H4, Hi Tech has a positive effect on the likelihood of being acquired. In all 
specifications, the coefficients of Hi Tech are positive and significant at the 1% level. Being a hi-tech 
firm, its visibility lead to the likelihood of getting acquired 40% higher, vis-à-vis non hi-tech.  
In specification 1 and 2, we omit Market-to-book and Rnd respectively due to the presence of Hi Tech 
dummy because hi-tech firms usually have high growth opportunities and/or intensive input in R & D. 
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However, the results for key variables are robust. 
One firm level control variable, Intangibility, is positive and significant at 10% level across all 
specifications. This further confirms our previous analysis that firms unable to reveal their quality or 
credibility, those with high level of intangible assets, those in hi-tech industries, can enhance their 
visibility through IPO, and subsequently get acquired in the M & A market.  
The coefficient on Size suggests that the double exit firms are actually not smaller than mature IPOs, 
but it is insignificant. Double exit firms have higher Debt level and higher capital spending but neither 
of the variables is significant. Market to book ratio is insignificant, since it is a proxy for both growth 
opportunities and asymmetric information, which may be well captured by the Hi Tech dummy. Fcf 
also has positive coefficient, consistent with previous research results that firms with high level of free 
cash flow will more likely to be on the radar of corporate raiders. However, it is statistically 
insignificant. 
In summary, the results in Panel A strongly supports our hypotheses that firms backed by venture 
capitalists, underwritten by prestigious investment banks, and rooted in hi-tech sectors are more likely 
to become double exit firms. 
Panel B regressions augment Panel A by introducing industry specific characteristics. The industry 
distribution in Panel C of Table 2 sheds light on the possible influence of a particular industry 
environment. We comparing regression 1 in Panel B with regression 1 in Panel A, the coefficient on 
the hypothesized variables have similar direction, magnitude and significance in both regressions.  
The coefficient on HHI is positive, the coefficient on Big Player is mixed, and the coefficient on Stdev 
is negative. However, their effects are not obvious. We offer several possible explanations. First, the Hi 
Tech dummy already captures some of the common industry characteristics. Second, the industry 
distribution between targets and acquirers in Panel C of Table 2 already shows the targets were 
typically in the same industry as the acquirers, which sheds light on the possibility that acquirers know 
better about their own industry environment. The coefficient of Analysts N is positive and significant, 
since our high tech industries are all within manufacturing and service sectors, two sectors well sought 
after by market analysts. 
The regressions in Panel C includes market timing variables along with firm specific and industry 
specific variables from Panel A and Panel B. In Panel C regressions we use CRSP value weighted 
return to control for the market fluctuation instead of year dummies. While the effect of VC Backing, 
Prestigious IB, and Hi Tech remains quantitatively and qualitatively significant, the likelihood of 
becoming a double exit firm is significantly positively related to the lagged annual stock market return 
and industry wide merger waves, which further supports findings highlighted by Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2003) that merger waves are correlated with high stock 
market valuations. The clustering of merger activities within industries precedes some IPO firms’ quick 
acquisition by other public firms suggests the merger waves display a pattern with long swings.  
In summary, the empirical evidence from the multivariate probit analysis in Table 4 shows that why 
double exit firms are so quickly acquired is broadly consistent with the hypotheses in Section 2. We 
find that the proxies for quality of the IPO firms, measures of asymmetric information, and market 
conditions have a very significant impact on the probability of double exit. 
While we find no evidence of a positive relationship between underpricing and the incidence of double 
exit firms across all the specifications, we attempt to examine the phenomenon in greater details. We 
first narrow down the IPO-acquisition window to 1 year, and re-estimate the models. However, there is 
still no evidence that underpricing plays an important role in increasing the chance of acquisition. 
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Therefore we eliminate the possibility that the effect of underpricing is only transient. If people do not 
have short memories for firm’s underpricing in IPO, why are acquirers not particularly interested in 
IPOs that are highly underpriced? As previous literature generally considers underpricing as a degree of 
information asymmetry between firm and outsiders, our findings here do not lend support to this view. 
If IPO serves as a signal, at least in the eyes of firms buying new IPO firms, the quality is better 
conveyed by the presence of prestigious investment banks involved in IPOs. This leaves one caveat for 
future research. 
 
Table 4. Multivariate Regression 
Panel A.  
 Reg.1  Reg.2  Reg.3  Reg.4  
 
Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio 
Coefficient
Odds 
Ratio
Coefficient
Odds 
Ratio
Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio
Underpricing -0.098 0.907 -0.140 0.869 -0.108 0.897 -0.092 0.912
 (0.111)  (0.100)  (0.111)  (0.112)  
VC Backing 0.236*** 1.267 0.392*** 1.481 0.272*** 1.313 0.293*** 1.340
 (0.108)  (0.104)  (0.111)  (0.116)  
Prestigious IB 0.54*** 1.716 0.394*** 1.483 0.566*** 1.761 0.575*** 1.778
 (0.138)  (0.129)  (0.140)  (0.141)  
Hi Tech 0.318*** 1.375 0.366*** 1.442 0.338*** 1.403 0.354*** 1.425
 (0.113)  (0.107)  (0.114)  (0.115)  
Size 0.033 1.034 0.145*** 1.157 0.019 1.020 0.019 1.020
 (0.044)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.044)  
Debt 0.200 1.222 -0.436** 0.646 0.168 1.183 0.143 1.154
 (0.248)  (0.220)  (0.251)  (0.255)  
Intangibility 0.577* 1.782 0.447* 1.564 0.58* 1.787 0.595* 1.814
 (0.355)  (0.334)  (0.354)  (0.355)  
Market-to-book 0.001 1.001   0.001 1.001 0.001 1.001
 (0.001)    -0.001  (0.001)  
Capex 1.153 3.169 0.665 1.946 1.043** 2.839 1.077* 2.938
 (0.608)  (0.562)  (0.607)  (0.604)  
Roa -0.027 0.973 -0.108 0.898 -0.078 0.925 -0.079 0.923
 (0.219)  (0.152)  (0.190)  (0.194)  
Rnd   -1.009***  -0.737 0.478 -0.698 0.497
   (0.343)  (0.429)  (0.432)  
Fcf 0.152 1.165 0.057 1.059 0.110 1.116 0.111 1.118
 (0.176)  (0.138)  (0.160)  (0.161)  
Insider 
Ownership       -2.359 0.698
       (0.435)  
Liquidity       0.006 1.007
       (0.255)  
Year Dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  
Number of Obs 12771  17505  12771  12344  
Pseudo R2 0.04  0.054  0.0428  0.0436  
Note. Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors, are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicated 
significance at the 1,5,10 percent level respectively. 
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Panel B.  
 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
 
Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient
Odds 
Ratio
Underpricing -0.108 0.898  -0.108 0.898 -0.035 0.965 -0.035 0.965  -0.161 0.851
 (0.112)  (0.111)  (0.118)  (0.118)  (0.117)  
VC Backing 0.276** 1.318  0.270** 1.311 0.169  1.184 0.165* 1.180  0.246** 1.279
 (0.112)  (0.111)  (0.124)  (0.124)  (0.113)  
Prestigious IB 0.567*** 1.764  0.563*** 1.756 0.469*** 1.599 0.47*** 1.601  0.585*** 1.795
 (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.153)  (0.153)  (0.142)  
Hi Tech 0.347*** 1.416  0.336*** 1.400 0.412*** 1.510 0.407** 1.504  0.313*** 1.368
 (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.115)  
Size 0.021  1.022  0.020  1.021 -0.058 0.943 -0.061 0.941  -0.066 0.936
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.048)  
Debt 0.163  1.177  0.165  1.180 0.399  1.492 0.403  1.497  0.298 1.347
 (0.252)  (0.251)  (0.283)  (0.282)  (0.248)  
Intangibility 0.591** 1.807  0.583* 1.792 1.092** 2.981 1.078** 2.939  0.571 1.771
 (0.353)  (0.354)  (0.456)  (0.456)  (0.360)  
Market-to-book 0.001  1.001  0.001  1.001 -0.001 1.000 -0.001 1.000  -0.001 1.001
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Capex  1.055** 2.872  1.048* 2.852 1.553** 4.726 1.531** 4.621  0.899 2.458
 (0.605)  (0.607)  (0.893)  (0.898)  (0.641)  
Roa -0.086 0.918  -0.078 0.924 -0.486 0.615 -0.473 0.623  -0.112 0.894
 (0.192)  (0.190)  (0.304)  (0.303)  (0.193)  
Rnd -0.700 0.497  -0.741* 0.476 -1.354 0.258 -1.395 0.247  -0.784* 0.456
 (0.428)  (0.430)  (0.429)  (0.430)  (0.430)  
Fcf 0.115  1.122  0.109  1.116 0.004  1.004 -0.004 0.996  0.134 1.144
 (0.162)  (0.160)  (0.223)  (0.221)  (0.163)  
HHI 0.661 1.938   1.040 2.831   0.713 2.042
 (0.728)    (0.850)    (0.727)  
Big Player   -0.033 0.968   0.170  1.186    
   (0.206)    (0.247)    
Stdev     -0.031 0.969 -0.032 0.968    
     (0.039)  (0.039)    
Analysts_n         0.089*** 1.094
         (0.015)  
Pseudo R2 0.043  0.0428  0.052  0.053  0.053  
Note. Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors, are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicated 
significance at the 1,5,10 percent level respectively. 
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Panel C. 
 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
 
Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient
Odds 
Ratio
Underpricing -0.107 0.898  -0.001 0.998 -0.108 0.897 -0.060 0.941 -0.099 0.905
 (0.111)  (0.099)  (0.109)  (0.103)  (0.107)  
VC Backing 0.276** 1.318  0.247** 1.280 0.222** 1.249 0.218** 1.244  0.183** 1.201
 (0.112)  (0.111)  (0.110)  (0.110)  (0.111)  
Prestigious IB 0.567*** 1.764  0.511*** 1.668 0.534*** 1.707 0.544*** 1.724  0.573*** 1.774
 (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.143)  
Hi Tech 0.349*** 1.418  0.359*** 1.433 0.061** 1.063 0.248** 1.282  0.204** 1.227
 (0.123)  (0.119)  0.126   (0.119)  (0.120)  
Size 0.021  1.022  0.006  1.069 0.044 1.045 0.038 1.039  -0.062 0.939
 (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.047)  
Debt 0.163  1.177  0.134  1.144 0.153  1.166 0.101  1.107  0.259 1.296
 (0.253)  (0.256)  (0.254)  (0.254)  (0.248)  
Intangibility 0.591* 1.807  0.781** 2.184 0.380  1.463 0.501  1.651  0.474 1.607
 (0.353)  (0.352)  (0.360)  (0.362)  (0.368)  
Market-to-book 0.001  1.001  0.001  1.001 0.001 1.001 0.001 1.001  0.001 1.001
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Capex 1.054* 2.872  1.179** 3.254 0.935  2.545 0.952  2.591  0.835 2.306
 (0.605)  (0.584)  (0.604)  (0.594)  (0.632)  
Roa -0.086 0.918  -0.110 0.896 -0.085 0.918 -0.061 0.940  -0.067 0.935
 (0.192)  (0.289)  (0.202)  (0.210)  (0.217)  
Rnd -0.700 0.497  -0.521 0.593 -0.523 0.593 -0.633 0.531  -0.748 0.473
 (0.428)  (0.461)  (0.414)  (0.431)  (0.438)  
Fcf 0.116  1.123  0.051  1.053 0.091  1.096 0.049 1.051  0.066 1.069
 (0.162)  (0.149)  (0.153)  (0.141)  (0.146)  
HHI 0.661 1.937 -0.486 0.615 0.715 2.045 0.910 2.486 1.004 2.730
 (0.728)  (0.828)  (0.760)  (0.783)  (0.776)  
Analysts_n         0.089 1.093
         (0.015)  
Hitech Bubble -0.009 0.991  0.096 1.101 -0.162 0.850 (0.070) 0.932  (0.042) 0.959
   (0.195)  (0.198)  (0.200)  (0.201)  
CRSP_vw   0.929*** 2.534 0.922*** 2.515 0.945*** 2.574  1.031*** 2.806
   (0.351)  (0.340)  (0.344)  (0.350)  
Merger Intensity 
N     0.267*** 1.307     
     (0.046)      
Merger Intensity 
Amt       0.108  1.114  0.105*** 1.111
       (0.030)  (0.03)  
Pseudo R2 0.043  0.0237  0.0344  0.0304  0.0374  
Note. Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors, are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicated 
significance at the 1,5,10 percent level respectively. 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study examines the double exit phenomenon—new IPO firms get acquired quickly in the M & A 
market. Previous theory has provided framework that insiders can maximize total proceeds by first 
selling cash flow rights in IPO and subsequent selling the control rights. It is widely known that private 
targets receive a significant price discount while public targets are selling at a premium.  
In this study, we attempt to discern the distinct characteristics of new public firms that made them 
acquired soon after their IPOs. Specifically we find that double exit firms are those backed by venture 
capital. Double exit firms generally have prestigious investment banks underwrite their IPOs. High 
technology firms are more likely to be taken over soon after their IPOs. Also, double exit firms have 
higher level of intangible assets.   
We suggest that IPO may play an important role in firms’ following acquisition incidence. First, IPO 
helps to reduce ex ante transaction costs between firms and financial markets, such as raising external 
capitals. In the M & A market particularly, among all public firms, those with severe information 
asymmetry problems will most benefit from going public. As information asymmetry typically prevails 
the M & A market, IPO can reduce asymmetric information problem by disclosing accounting 
information, undergoing SEC scrutiny and analyst coverage. Second, IPOs wink signals concerning the 
quality of the firm.  
Our results supplement a number of previous researches. In Brau and Fawcett (2006), CFOs cite the top 
two reasons to go public are to create public shares for use in future acquisition and to establish a 
market value for the firm. While recent empirical papers investigate IPO firms as acquirers (Cxxx, 
2009; Hovakimian & Hutton, 2009), we provide a complementary look by examining IPO firms as M 
& A targets. While it is hard to argue that double exit firms go public to become targets in acquisitions, 
IPO indeed increases their probability of being acquired. Especially for high tech firms, IPO serves as a 
visibility-enhancing strategic move. IPO also alleviates the valuation uncertainty problem for both the 
sellers and bidders.  
Literature has widely emphasized the certification role of venture capital. VCs’ involvement during the 
early stage of a firm’s business life has been long documented, and our result further shows that it has 
far reaching consequence in firms’ transition later to both IPO market and M & A market.   
Due to the asymmetric information, signaling theory continues to be an inseparable component of IPOs. 
Consistent with previous research (Brau & Fawcett, 2003), using a top investment banker is the one of 
the strongest signals sending by the firm. Certification by a prestigious investment bank facilitates the 
subsequent takeover of double exit firms. 
As IPOs are generally treated as an independent decision, our findings of the timing of double exit 
incidences shed light on the possible connection between the IPO market and the M & A market. IPOs 
are not the final destination for entrepreneurs, top managers, and venture capitalists.  
We are left with the puzzle of why those firms go IPO in the first place. It would also be interesting to 
see whether the signals sent by IPOs have any impact of the payment methods in M & A. Investment 
banks play an important role in firms IPO, acting as merger advisors, either for target firms or 
acquiring firms. Our hope is that this paper will encourage a more thorough and robust line for future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp              Journal of Business Theory and Practice               Vol. 6, No. 2, 2018 
199 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
References  
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for “Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431 
Allen, F., & Faulhaber, G. (1989). Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO Market. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 23, 303-323. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(89)90060-3 
Beatty, F., & Ritter, J. (1986). Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 213-232. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(86)90055-3 
Brau, J., & Fawcett, S. (2006). Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice. Journal of 
Finance, 61(1), 399-436. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00840.x 
Brau, J., Francis, B., & Kohers, N. (2003). The Choice between IPO versus Takeover: Empirical 
Evidence. Journal of Business, 76(4), 583-621. https://doi.org/10.1086/377032 
Brau, J., Sutton, N., & Hatch, N. (2010). Dual-Track versus Single-Track Sell-outs: A Empirical 
Analysis of Competing Harvest Strategies. Journal of Business Venturing, 25, 389-402. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2008.10.009 
Carter, R., & Manaster, S. (1990). Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation. Journal of 
Finance, XLV(4), 1045-1067. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02426.x 
Celikyurk, U., Sevilir, M., & Shivdasani, A. (2014). Venture Capitalists on Boards of Mature Public 
Firms. Review of Financial Studies, 27(1), 56-101. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs096 
Chemmanur, T., Nandy, D., & He, S. (2010). The Going Public Decision and Product Market. Review of 
Financial Studies, 23(5), 1855-1908. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp098 
Duchin, R., & Schmit, B. (2013). Riding the Merger Wave: Uncertainty, Reduced Monitoring, and Bad 
Acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(1), 69-88. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.07.003 
Field, L., & Hanka, G. (2001). The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups. Journal of Finance, 56(2), 
471-500. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00334 
Golbe, D., & White, L. (1993). Catch a Wave: The Time Series Behavior of Mergers. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 75(3), 493-499. https://doi.org/10.2307/2109463 
Grossman, S., & Stiglitz, J. (1980). On the Impossibility of Information Efficiency Markets. American 
Economic Review, 70(3), 393-408. 
Hamid, M., & Stavros, P. (2010). Financial Visibility and the Decision to Go Private. Review of 
Financial Studies, 23(2), 519-547. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp044 
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1993). Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring. Journal of Political 
Economy, 101(4), 678-709. https://doi.org/10.1086/261893 
Hovakimian, A., & Hutton, I. (2010). Market Feedback and Equity Issuance: Evidence from Repeat 
Equity Issues. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Accounting, 45(3), 739-762. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109010000268 
Hsieh, J., Lyandres, E., & Zhdanov, A. (2011). A Theory of Merger-Driven IPOs. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 46(5), 1367-1405. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109011000421 
Jenkinson, T., & Ljungqvist, W. (2001). The Role of Hostile Stakes in German Corporate Governance. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(4), 397-446. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00034-7 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp              Journal of Business Theory and Practice               Vol. 6, No. 2, 2018 
200 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Kohers, N., & Kohers, T. (2000). The Value Creation Potential of High Tech Mergers. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 56, 40-50. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v56.n3.2359 
Leland, H., & Pyle, D. (1977). Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 287-371. https://doi.org/10.2307/2326770 
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. (2004). Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Overtime? Financial 
Management, 33(3), 5-37. 
Maksimovic, V., & Pichler, P. (2001). Technological Innovation and Initial Public Offerings. Review of 
Financial Studies, 14(2), 459-494. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/14.2.459 
Matthew, R. K., & Viswanathan, S. (2004). Market Valuation and Merger Waves. Journal of Finance, 
59(6), 2685-2718. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00713.x 
Mitchell, M., & Mulherin, H. (1996). The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring 
Activity. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(2), 193-229. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00860-H 
Officer, M. (2007). The Price of Corporate Liquidity: Acquisition Discounts for Unlisted Targets. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 83(3), 571-598. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.004 
Pagano, M., & Ailsa, R. (1998). The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, 
and the Decision to Go Public. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 187-225. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555568 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., & Zingales, L. (1998). Why Do Companies Go Public: An Empirical Analysis. 
Journal of Finance, 53(1), 27-64. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.25448 
Reuer, J., & Shen, J. C. (2004). Sequential divestiture through initial public offerings. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 54(2), 249-266. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.003 
Richard, J. R., Scott, B. S., & Chad J. Z. (2005). Why do firms go public? Evidence from the banking 
industry. In Working Paper Series WP-05-17. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Ritter, J. (2011). Equilibrium in the Initial Public Offerings Market. Annual Review of Financial 
Economics, 3(1), 347-374. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-102710-144845 
Rydqvist, K., & Högholm, K. (1995). Going public in the 1980s: Evidence from Sweden. European 
Financial Management, 1, 287-315. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.1995.tb00021.x 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70(3), 295-311. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00211-3 
Teoh, S., Welch, I., & Wong, T. (1998). Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance 
of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1935-1974. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00079 
Zingales, L. (1995). Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public. Review of Economic Studies, 
62(3), 425-448. https://doi.org/10.2307/2298036 
 
Notes 
Note 1. CNet news, 12/19/1999. 
Note 2. E-Commerce Times, 2/15/2002. 
Note 3. Fitch and Benjamin, 1998, Gomez, 1999, Thurm, 2000, Huf, 2000. 
Note 4. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) provide evidence that there is clustering of mergers over time. 
The anecdote mentioned above also suggested that IPO waves precede acquisition waves. 
Note 5. SDC provides description on firm’s business description, and their indicator of “high 
technology” turns out to be unreliable as shown by Field and Hanka 2001. 
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Note 6. We will present the results from the hazard analysis in the next subsection. 
Note 7. From Wiki, “Research and Development”. 
Note 8. All dollar amounts are adjusted by 2007 dollar. 
Note 9. All dollar amounts are adjusted by 2007 dollar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
